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TRUSTING BIG DATA RESEARCH
Neil Richards* & Woodrow Hartzog**
ABSTRACT
Although it might puzzle or even infuriate data scientists, suspicion
about big data is understandable.  The concept does not seem promis-
ing to most people.  It seems scary.  This is partly because big data re-
search is shrouded in mystery.  People are unsure about organizations’
motives and methods.  What do companies think they know about us?
Are they keeping their insights safe from hackers?  Are they selling their
insights to unscrupulous parties?  Most importantly, do organizations
use our personal information against us?  Big data research will only
overcome its suspicious reputation when people can trust it.
Some scholars and commentators have proposed review processes as
an answer to big data’s credibility problem.  It is possible that a review
process for big data research could provide the oversight to ensure the
ethical use of data we have been hoping for, applying sensible procedu-
ral rules to regularize data science.  But procedure alone is not enough.
In this essay, we argue that to truly protect data subjects, organizations
must embrace the notion of trust when they use data about or to affect
their human users, employees, or customers.  Promoting meaningful
trust involves structuring procedures around affirmative, substantive
obligations designed to ensure organizations act as proper stewards of
the data with which they are entrusted.  To overcome the failures of a
compliance mentality, companies must vow to be Protective, Discreet,
Honest, and above all, Loyal to data subjects.  Such commitments
backed up by laws will help ensure that companies are as vulnerable to
us as we are to them.  When we know we can trust those using big data,
the concept might not seem so scary after all.  We will disclose more and
more accurate information in safe, sustainable ways. And we will all be
better off.
* Thomas and Karole Green Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, Affili-
ate Scholar, The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School, Affiliated Fellow, Yale
Information Society Project.
** Starnes Professor of Law, Samford University Cumberland School of Law, Affiliate
Scholar, The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School.
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I. INTRODUCTION
To those in industry, policymakers, and academia, the scientific
tools colloquially referred to as “big data” are exciting.  Data science
has the potential to change our lives for the better, to be, in the words
of two scholars, “a revolution that will transform how we live, work,
and think.”1  Powerful algorithms can be combined with mountains of
personal information to produce insights and predictions to help solve
virtually any problem we can think of, but for most people, big data
does not seem promising.  It seems scary.
The public paranoia is understandable because big data research is
shrouded in mystery.  People are unsure about organizations’ motives
and methods.  What do companies know about us?  Are they keeping
their insights safe from hackers?  Are they selling their insights to un-
scrupulous parties?  Most importantly, do organizations use our data
against us?  Like other Information Age concepts that cause privacy
anxiety, like biometrics, automated technologies, and the Internet of
Things, big data research will only overcome its suspicious and clan-
destine reputation when people can come to trust it.
Scholars, commentators, companies, and even the White House
have proposed review processes of various sorts as an answer to big
data’s credibility problem.2  These review processes could be imple-
mented by those conducting big data research to provide the same
kind of protections ensured by university Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs), which seek to make sure that those conducting research on
humans minimize risk, follow ethical research principals, and receive
informed consent.3  Proposals of this sort are well worth investigating
and debating.  It is certainly possible that structural review processes
for big data research could provide the oversight to ensure the ethical
use of data we have been hoping for; however, procedure alone will
not be enough.  We also need the right substantive safeguards.
Procedural approaches to big data research pose at least three
problems.  First, organizations risk falling into a compliance mentality,
seeking only to satisfy procedural (instead of substantive) demands.
When this happens, organizations can cut corners and do the least
1. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 11 (2013).
2. See, e.g., Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015, S. 1158, 114th Cong. § 103(c) (1st
Sess. 2015); Ryan Calo, Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought Experiment, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 97 (2013); Jules Polonetsky et al., Beyond the Common Rule: Ethical Structures for Data
Research in Non-Academic Settings, 13 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 333, 334 (2015); Mike
Schroepfer, Research at Facebook, FACEBOOK (Oct. 2, 2014), http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/
10/research-at-facebook/.
3. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. R
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amount possible, and the spirit of the law becomes subservient to the
letter of the law.  Second, the dominant procedural approaches are all
premised upon the manufacturing or extraction of consent.  While
consent models might work well at the one-to-one level between
human researchers and subjects, they simply do not scale for either
institutions or humans.  Large organizations can manufacture mean-
ingless consent via boilerplate terms that no one reads nor should be
expected to read.
Moreover, meaningful informed consent would be so burdensome
at scale as to make most big data research (and indeed most uses of
data) cost prohibitive.  Just imagine employees at Facebook offering a
one-on-one chat session with each of its 1.86 billion monthly active
users to answer questions they might have about the research it is con-
ducting with user data.4  Similarly, from the perspective of individual
humans in information relationships, the typical modern human
(whether we call her a “user,” a “consumer,” or a “citizen”) will have
scores or even hundreds of relationships with social networks, search
engines, cloud service providers, antivirus software manufacturers, in-
ternet service providers, hardware and operating system manufactur-
ers of home or mobile computers, tablets or phones, airlines, taxi and
transportation companies, and accounts with online, offline, and hy-
brid merchants and websites offering a bewildering array of services
and an equally bewildering array of practices with respect to their per-
sonal data.  This is before we get into information relationships with
which users may be unaware, such as those with data brokers and ad-
vertiser networks.  From the perspective of either humans or institu-
tions, the model of careful informed consent on which procedural
methods rest is impractical at best (and farcical and fraudulent at
worst).
Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), including data minimi-
zation, control, security, and notice, have played a critical role in our
“small data” world5 but a few of the principles struggle with big data.
The FIPPs that are focused on the procedural requirements of notice
and consent do not scale well because they eventually overwhelm peo-
ple.  Giving people control over their data can feel debilitating or like
a trap given the difficulties in ascertaining risk and lack of real op-
4. Company Info, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2017) (listing the number of users as of December 31, 2016).
5. See ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY 14–15 (June 17,
2016), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf.
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tions.  Consent and harm are good but are mismatches as they do not
really remedy what we are concerned about.6
There is a better model for big data research than rote and mean-
ingless “compliance and consent.”  In this essay, we argue that to truly
protect data subjects, organizations must embrace the notion of trust
as a guiding principle in their processing of personal data.  This in-
volves structuring procedures around affirmative obligations designed
to ensure organizations act as adequate7 stewards of the data with
which they are entrusted.  Right now, people distrust companies that
are trying to leverage personal information with big data techniques.
The Target Pregnancy story is the evergreen anecdote justifying big
data paranoia,8 but consider also the backlash against Facebook’s new
Artificial Intelligence assistant—“M”—and its infamous “mood
study” that explored the algorithmic possibilities of emotional
manipulation.9
Procedures to ensure ethical big data research are necessary, but
alone they are wholly insufficient.  Without the right substantive rules,
ethical review processes risk becoming mere formalities on the road to
data strip mining.  We can do better than creating mere incentives for
6. See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 20 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 431, 436–37 (2016); see also Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust
Gap, 126 YALE L.J. 1180 (2017).  Other scholars have also recently started to examine the rela-
tionship between privacy and trust. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and
the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016); Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth
Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611 (2015); Dennis D. Hirsch, Privacy, Public
Goods, and the Tragedy of the Trust Commons: A Response to Professors Fairfield and Engel, 65
DUKE L.J. ONLINE 67 (2016); Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, “I’ll See”: How Surveillance
Undermines Privacy by Eroding Trust, 32 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 221 (2016); Ari Ezra
Waldman, A Breach of Trust: Fighting ‘Revenge Porn,’ 102 IOWA L. REV. 709 (2017); Ari Ezra
Waldman, Manipulating Trust on Facebook, 29 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 175 (2016); Ari Ezra
Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 559 (2015); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study, 67 CASE
WEST. RES. L. REV. 193 (2016).
7. We use this word consciously with its echoes of the “adequacy” requirement of European
Data Protection Law. See Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Union, The Court of
Justice Declares that the Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision Is Invalid (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf; see also Robert
Levine, Behind the European Privacy Ruling that’s Confounding Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 9, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1NsQP6a; cf. Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (E.C.J. 2015), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:62014CJ0362&from=EN.
8. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16,
2012), https://nyti.ms/2jEboTD (detailing Target’s strategy of identifying women in their second
trimester of pregnancy).
9. See, e.g., Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Facebook’s New Digital Assistant ‘M’ Will
Need to Earn Your Trust, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2015/sep/09/what-should-we-demand-of-facebooks-new-digital-assistant.
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compliance with procedures, and we must do better if data science is
to achieve its touted potential.10  To overcome the failures of a compli-
ance mentality, we argue that companies (and other institutions
processing personal data) must adhere to four substantive commit-
ments when they process personal data of people with whom they
have an information relationship.  Such institutions must vow to be
Protective, Discreet, Honest, and above all, Loyal to data subjects.
Such commitments backed up by laws will help ensure that companies
are as vulnerable to us as we are to them.  When we know we can trust
those using big data, the concept might not seem so scary after all.  We
will disclose more and better information in a safe, sustainable way,
and we will all be better off.
II. PROTECTION
Big data requires distribution and linked research projects.  Data
must be stored in order to exist, and it must be accessible in order to
be useful.  At scale, big databases are honeypots that demand robust
data security.  One key component of data security is the old FIPPs of
data minimization.11  Data that does not exist cannot be leaked or
hacked.  Of course, data that does not exist cannot be exploited, and it
is for this reason that data minimization is seen by some as anathema
to good data science.12  Such a “collect it all and let the algorithm sort
it out” mindset makes big data risker than your average dataset.  To
make matters worse, in the age of the data breach, there are three
kinds of organizations: those that know they have been breached,
those on the precipice of breach, and those that have been breached
discreetly and just do not know it yet.13
The FIPPs have long recognized the need for data security.  “Data
Protection” in its most literal sense implies data security even more
than it does privacy.  The first “code of fair information practices”
issued by the famous 1973 Advisory Report of the Committee of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare concluded that “[a]ny
10. See Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393,
393 (2014).
11. See GELLMAN, supra note 5, at 15. R
12. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 259 (2013) (“The big data business model is
antithetical to data minimization.”).
13. This is with apologies to former FBI Director James Comey, who famously quipped on
CBS’s 60 Minutes that “there are two kinds of big companies in the United States.  There are
those who’ve been hacked by the Chinese and those who don’t know they’ve been hacked by the
Chinese.”  Scott Pelley, FBI Director on Threat of ISIS, Cybercrime, CBS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-director-james-comey-on-threat-of-isis-cybercrime/ (transcrib-
ing the CBS television broadcast).
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organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for
their intended use and must take reasonable precautions to prevent
misuse of the data.”14  Subsequent versions of the FIPPs have invaria-
bly held data security up as a foundational requirement of the ethical
management of any personal data processing or storage, especially as
the Age of the Data Breach has arrived.15
There is a problem with the way in which the obligation of “secur-
ity” has manifested in law and corporate business practices.  An obli-
gation of “security” is an ambiguous one, and a company can take
different approaches to data security.  One of the most common ap-
proaches has been compliance-based, which involves checking off a
list of reasonable technical and administrative measures, merely to
avoid liability.  This view manifests itself in demands that data security
requirements be bright-line rules that contain safe harbors for prac-
tices that meet common security practices in the industry.  A compli-
ance mentality dictates that once a certain threshold of security has
been met, the problem is solved.
But procedure should be just one part of an organization’s ap-
proach to data security.  A security requirement based on compliance
with “industry standards” is ineffective and insecure if industry stan-
dards are themselves insufficient.  Such an approach would be akin to
resting workplace safety rules on the labor practices of sweatshops at
the turn of the last century.  Companies certainly deserve clear and
fair guidance from the law, but the protection of personal data cannot
be merely about avoiding liability.  Instead of a procedurally watered-
down version of the FIPP of “security,” we suggest instead a robust
duty of Protection should apply to warehouses of personal data.
This principle looks not only to traditional safeguards and proce-
dures, but it also attempts to protect information as it flows down-
stream.  Industry standards are a good starting point for this process;
however, the true test of adequacy for companies that embrace the
protection principle will be whether organizations took all steps within
reason to protect a subject’s information in order to preserve trust.
Did an organization only protect data until it was transferred to a
third party?  Did a company follow the pack even when industry stan-
dards were insufficient, such as with the widespread failure of the
14. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41, 50 (1973) [herein-
after 1973 FIPPs], https://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/.
15. See GELLMAN, supra note 5, at 14–15. R
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password and lack of adoption of two-factor authentication?16  Ap-
ple’s lack of two-factor authentication in light of the notorious iCloud
hack is a prime example of a company failing to fully embrace the
protection principle.17
Instead of making security merely a compliance obligation, organi-
zations should focus on creating value by protecting data.  Robust ef-
forts at data protection will help gain and keep the trust of data
subjects, which will generate more disclosures within a safe, sustaina-
ble relationship.  Companies that go beyond mere checklists and make
data protection a priority through the allocation of resources and time
should be considered trustworthy.
Companies can directly benefit from robust security as well.
Breached data can be changed and corrupted.  Data integrity is a key
principal of data security.  It also directly implicates the financial in-
terests of companies entrusted with personal information.  Without in-
tegrity, data is useless.  Corrupt data can even be harmful if the
corruption goes undiscovered.  Thus data protection does more than
generate trust, it directly benefits companies by ensuring that the in-
formation they are entrusted with remains useful.
III. DISCRETION
One of the major fears people have over big data research is who
will have access to insights gleaned from big data.  One of the popular
big data anecdotes involves the insight that people who buy pads for
their furniture are better insurance risks.18  In addition, credit compa-
nies have been looking to Facebook profiles as part of their decision
to extend credit.19  Are they buying big data insights from other com-
panies as well?  This is part of the reason why people have trust issues
with big data.  Put simply, people do not know what happens to their
16. See, e.g., Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, Should the FTC Kill the Password? The
Case for Better Authentication, 14 BLOOMBERG BNA PRIVACY & SEC. L. REP. 1353 (2015).
17. Arik Hesseldahl, Apple Says It Is “Actively Investigating” Celeb Photo Hack, RECODE
(Sept. 1, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://recode.net/2014/09/01/apple-says-it-is-actively-investigating-celeb-
photo-hack/; Paul Tamburo, WWDC 15: Apple Ensures “The Fappening” Won’t Happen Again
with Two-Factor iCloud Authentication, CRAVE (June 8, 2015), http://www.craveonline.com/de
sign/864955-wwdc-15-apple-ensures-fappening-wont-happen-two-factor-icloud-authentication#
scWUL2DZMg8QT7C8.99.
18. Jonathan Shaw, Why “Big Data” Is a Big Deal, HARVARD MAG., Mar.-Apr. 2014, at 30, 31
(“Credit-card companies have found unusual associations in the course of mining data to evalu-
ate the risk of default: people who buy anti-scuff pads for their furniture, for example, are highly
likely to make their payments.”).
19. How Your Facebook Profile Can Affect Your Credit, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Nov. 2, 2015,
6:12 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/national/how-your-facebook-profile-can-affect-your-
credit/npD9X/.
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information once it is (as they often colloquially put it) “out there,”
which makes them fearful and distrustful of both the system and those
who may be using the data.
Like Security, one of the bedrock FIPPs is nondisclosure.  The 1973
Advisory Report of the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare mandated that “[t]here must be a way for an individual to prevent
information about him that was obtained for one purpose from being
used or made available for other purposes without his consent” and
further placed an obligation on organizations holding personal data to
“take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.”20  Similar require-
ments run through all sincere restatements of the FIPPs, including the
recent White House “Privacy Bill of Rights.”21  These requirements
are part of an ancient tradition in our law, protecting shared personal
information through duties of confidentiality, whose overtones of
“confidence” resonate directly with notions of “trust.”22
In practice, however, our longstanding commitments to confidenti-
ality, or at least nondisclosure, have been gutted by the procedural
approach to the FIPPs.  Notions of confidentiality have been replaced
by a compliance-based system of “notice and choice,” in which the
default of nondisclosure has increasingly flipped to a default of disclo-
sure unless a person takes affirmative steps to opt out of data sharing.
In practice, opting out of data sharing often requires the termination
of an information relationship.  As we have argued elsewhere in much
greater detail, our commitments to nondisclosure have been replaced
by an illusion of control of our personal data.23
In the big data context, these problems threaten to become even
worse.  Confidentiality regimes are typically premised upon the confi-
dant not disclosing information received by the confider.  Big data,
however, involves predictions and insights derived from information
(some of it possibly confidential).  Theoretically, a confidant following
a compliance “letter, not spirit, of the law” approach might be able to
disclose predictions and insights without technically breaching confi-
dentiality.  A trust-based regime would apply to more than just confi-
dential information, extending an obligation to be discreet regarding
any personal information, disclosed or surmised.  The data subject
20. See 1973 FIPPs, supra note 14, at xx–xxi. R
21. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Plan to Protect Privacy in the Internet Age
by Adopting a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2012/02/23/fact-sheet-plan-protect-privacy-internet-age-adopting-consumer-privacy-
b. See generally GELLMAN, supra note 5. R
22. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confi-
dentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 135 (2007).
23. Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, supra note 6, at 444–47. R
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would feel betrayed if disclosed indiscreetly or to wrongful persons.
The broad scope of this obligation would be mitigated by the fact that
a duty of discretion means limited disclosure is allowed to other trust-
worthy parties and for purposes not adverse to the data subject’s in-
terest.  The important point is that discretion is more permissive than
a fiduciary duty of confidentiality, but it should apply more broadly.
An obligation of discretion keeps companies from falling into a poten-
tially cynical compliance mentality that looks for technical loopholes
to disclosure obligations.  The onus instead is put on the entrustee for
reasonable disclosure under the circumstances.
IV. HONESTY
Since its inception, data protection law has also placed obligations
of notification on holders of personal data.  After all, it would be vir-
tually impossible to give data subjects the ability to control how their
data is used if they have no idea that the data exists in the first place.
The original 1973 FIPPs had two requirements along these lines.  They
mandated that first, “[t]here must be no personal data record-keeping
systems whose very existence is secret,” and second, “[t]here must be
a way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a
record and how it is used.”24
These requirements might seem substantive, but in practice they
have also fallen prey to a compliance-focused proceduralism.  The
dominant means of modern privacy regulation in the United States is
a thin regime of so-called “notice and choice,” in which data practices
are described in long privacy policies that all too often manage to be
both vague and wordy at the same time.25  The multiple problems with
this approach are well-documented; foremost among its flaws is the
fact that the onus of finding and reading these policies is placed upon
individual users, even though reading the privacy policies we encoun-
ter on a daily basis would literally take days to complete.26  The im-
practicality of notice and choice means that in practice its regime is a
24. See 1973 FIPPs, supra note 14, at xx. R
25. Florencia Marotta-Wagner, Does “Notice and Choice” Disclosure Regulation Work? 26
(NYU L. Sch., Working Paper No. 13, 2015), https://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/
lawandeconomics/workshops/Documents/Paper13.Marotta-Wurgler.Does%20Notice%20and%
20Choice%20Disclosure%20Work.pdf.
26. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 6, at 444–47; Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Manage- R
ment and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013); Alex C. Madrigal, Reading the
Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would Take 76 Work Days, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/reading-the-privacy-policies-you-encoun
ter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work-days/253851/; see also Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith
Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008).
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wholesale abandonment of the purpose of the FIPPs.  When applied
to the complex science and applications of big data, a notice and
choice regime relying on the efforts of users would be even more
laughable.
Instead of our current, cynical regime of notice and choice, we be-
lieve that institutions dealing with big data should adopt the substan-
tive principle of Honesty.  Instead of the constructive, lawyerly, and
realistically deceptive practice of “notice,” organizations should take
steps to be honest with their users about what they do and why they
do it.  Such an obligation would transcend the compliance-focused, le-
galistic notion of notice by focusing on what users actually understand
rather than on what institutions can get away with by burying their
activities in the fine print.  Honesty takes the obligation of under-
standing away from individual users, and places the obligation on the
organization to explain and to be understood.  Honesty takes the fic-
tion out of constructive notice to require actual notice.  But unlike
“consent” process models, honesty does not serve to transfer the risk
of loss onto data subjects.  Rather, it serves as a trust-building mecha-
nism to reduce anxiety and encourage mutually-beneficial, reciprocal
disclosure.
An obligation of Honesty also serves an additional function of forc-
ing companies to take stock of their information practices in order to
be accurate when keeping individuals informed.27  When users feel
that their data is being processed in ways they poorly understand, they
can feel like they are playing a kind of legalistic whack-a-mole.  It
should be no surprise that such disempowering tactics foster user sus-
picion and distrust.  In contrast, when institutions explain how and
why they are using data, this honesty can serve as an important foun-
dation of trust.
V. LOYALTY
Protection, Discretion, and Honesty are substantive principles with
long antecedents in data protection and privacy law around the globe.
Even organizations that are Protective, Discreet, and Honest might
find that these activities are not enough to build trust.  There is the
nagging suspicion among many users that organizations are still expos-
ing their data so that the organization will take advantage of them and
27. Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1263, 1264–65 (2002) (“[C]ritics have largely overlooked . . . important benefits from these no-
tices.  Perhaps most significantly, publication of the notices and the new legal obligation to com-
ply with them have forced financial institutions to engage in considerable self-scrutiny as to their
data handling practices.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-2\DPL211.txt unknown Seq: 11  8-JUN-17 12:45
2017] TRUSTING BIG DATA RESEARCH 589
enrich itself at their expense.  We see this fear of betrayal in the com-
mon adage that Facebook users, for example, are not the customers
but instead the product—groomed, curated, and offered up unsuspect-
ingly to Facebook’s fee-paying advertiser clients.28  Philosopher of
technology Nicholas Carr puts it more bluntly, calling such practices
“digital sharecropping.”29
To remedy this problem, we offer a fourth substantive principle to
build trust in information relationships involving big data.  We call this
principle Loyalty, the idea that organizations should not enrich them-
selves at the expense of their trusting users.  Although Loyalty is a
new value in the big data policy debate, it has very old antecedents in
the common law.  Because it is new, it has not yet had a chance to be
watered down by cynical proceduralism.  We must not allow that to
happen.  Loyalty is the linchpin of trust, for without it, users are justi-
fied in being suspicious of every use of their data and decision about
them a company makes.  Without loyalty, users are exposed to self-
dealing and betrayal.  Trust, as we have argued elsewhere, is the key
element to the kind of sustainable information relationships that are
the best future for the digital society.30
What does loyalty mean in the practice of big data research?  It
means that companies must put the interests of their users ahead of
the narrow short-term profit motive when deploying the products of
big data research.  It is ethical to mine the data trove of user informa-
tion to recommend movies, television shows, or even new services the
user may enjoy, but it is not ethical to use that data to discover their
reservation price.  Consider the trove of data that Amazon holds on
behalf of its users.  It can use that information to suggest new movies
they might want to rent or accessories for the products they already
own.  These kinds of offerings can be loyal and create value for both
the company and its customers.  A much harder case would be where
Amazon uses the fruits of its data research to find out the highest
price each customer would want to pay for each such product.  An-
other unjustified use of such data would be to uncover and exploit
compulsive behaviors or addictions, like personalizing shopping ex-
periences for suspected gambling addicts to resemble a slot machine.
Further, it would be a betrayal of the duty of Loyalty for Amazon to
28. Olivia Solon, You Are Facebook’s Product, Not Customer, WIRED UK (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011-09/21/doug-rushkoff-hello-etsy (attributing the phrase
to author Douglas Rushkoff).
29. Nicholas Carr, Digital Sharecropping, ROUGH TYPE (Dec. 19, 2006), http://
www.roughtype.com/?p=634.
30. See generally Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, supra note 6. R
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sell insights about its customers to those who might harm them,
whether data brokers, insurance companies, employers, or others.
Importantly, the duty of loyalty would allow for limited self-dealing
within reason, so long as it did not come at the expense of the data
subject.  Thus, companies would still be allowed to make some use of
entrusted information.  This obligation is a slightly more relaxed, but
it is also a more broadly applicable standard to that of fiduciaries.  If it
is calibrated correctly, a duty of loyalty could prevent a number of
information misuses at the heart of big data anxiety.  Like the tort of
negligence and the generally accepted standard for data security, what
is reasonable under the circumstances is entirely dependent upon con-
text, and it must be developed over time.  It is clear, however, that
without some sense that organizations will remain true to those who
trust them with their personal information, big data anxiety and dis-
trust will only continue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Big data paranoia is justified, yet ultimately unproductive.  We
should look for a way forward that allows us to explore some of the
potential benefits of big data, while avoiding some of its obvious risks.
We believe that trust should be the lodestar of big data ethics and law,
and that in order to promote trust, organizations must commit to Pro-
tection, Discretion, Honesty, and Loyalty.  To protect against the inev-
itable bad or short-sighted actors, the law should mandate these
protections where necessary.  Specifically, the law should shift away
from the FIPP based notions of consent that dominate review process
regimes like IRBs.  Consent at scale only shifts the risk of harm away
from companies and makes people skeptical.  If big data research is
ever going to get off the ground, organizations must give people a
reason to trust them.
